



ABSTRACTION, FILTRATION, AND COMPARISON IN 
PATENT LAW 
 MICHAEL RISCH† 
This essay explores how copyright’s doctrine of abstraction, filtration, 
and comparison is being used in patent law, and how that use could be 
improved. This test, which finds its roots in the 1930's but wasn’t fully 
developed until the 1990's, is one that defines scope for determining 
infringement. The copyrighted work is abstracted into parts, from ideas at 
the highest level to literal expression at the lowest. Then, unprotected 
elements are filtered out. Finally what remains of the original work is 
compared to the accused work to determine if the copying was illicit.  
This sounds far removed from patent law, but there is a kinship, though 
perhaps one that is not so historic and a bit hidden. The essence of the test 
is determining protectable subject matter. These same needs permeate 
patent law as well. This essay explores how the test is implicitly used and 
should be explicitly used.  
With design patents, the test might apply as it does in copyright, with 
functional elements being filtered out during infringement. Current 
precedent allows for this filtering, but not clearly or consistently. With 
utility patents, the abstraction, filtration, and comparison happen earlier, 
during the test for patentable subject matter. Here, the comparison is with 
what is conventional or well known. The essay concludes by discussing 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of abstraction and filtration has been a core part of the 
copyright infringement inquiry at least since Judge Hand issued his 
opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures.1 First, the plaintiff’s work is 
abstracted into its various components, from the most literal (say, the 
words of a novel) to the most abstract (the main idea of the novel). Then, 
those abstracted elements are put through a filter, whereby unprotected 
material is eliminated from consideration. The idea of a novel is not 
usually protectable, but the specific expression of the story would be.  
Only then are the remaining bits of copyright-protected expression 
compared with the allegedly infringing work. 
Patent law lacks an obvious analogue. The “all elements rule” is 
straightforward: every element of the patentee’s claim is compared 
against the allegedly infringing product or method. If every element is 
met, there is infringement. If any element is missing, there is no 
infringement. We do not eliminate the unpatentable, nor do we compare 
only the point of novelty.2 This particular “historic kinship”3 between 
copyright and patent law seems to be estranged. 
This essay seeks to heal the family rift in an unconventional way. It 
suggests that the courts are implicitly using abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison in both design patent and utility patent subject matter cases, 
and that they should do so more explicitly and carefully. 
Patentable subject matter, whether design or utility, is a natural fit 
for abstraction, filtration, and comparison. In copyright, after all, the 
filtration step is intended to remove those elements that are not 
copyrightable. So too with patent law. For utility patents, courts are 
attempting to filter unprotectable abstract ideas and natural phenomena 
 
1 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
2 Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011). 
3 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1983) (“The 
closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to refer because of 
the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”). 
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from protected inventions. For design patents, courts should filter 
functional elements from protected ornamental designs. The kinship of 
copyright and patent thus lends itself to similar filtration analysis.  
This essay proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the history and 
application of abstraction, filtration and comparison in copyright. It 
turns out that this “historic” practice is not all that historic. Furthermore, 
the rule is not uniformly adopted (or adopted at all) in all the circuits, 
though academics have come to view it as essential to proper copyright 
infringement analysis.4 
Part II examines utility patentable subject matter jurisprudence since 
Mayo v. Prometheus5 set forth a new two-step test to determine 
eligibility. First requiring a determination if the claim is “directed”6 to 
an abstract idea or natural phenomenon and then examining whether 
something unconventional was added to it.7 This test is an exercise in 
abstraction and filtration. The first step necessarily requires selection of 
the level of abstraction to view the claim, from very general to very 
specific. The second step then filters out whatever the court deems is 
unprotectable and compares the remaining elements against some 
notion of conventionality. 
Part III introduces design patent subject matter and the problem of 
functional designs. Where a design patent claim is both ornamental and 
functional, courts have had difficulty determining the proper scope of 
analysis for allegedly infringing devices that look similar only because 
they perform a similar function. This essay suggests that courts should 
more explicitly filter out functional elements before determining design 
patent infringement. 
The essay concludes by briefly discussing how and why abstraction 
and filtration differs between design patents and utility patents. The 
reason has little to do with the rationale for the kinship and everything 
to do with administrability. Quite simply, given how patentable subject 
matter and infringement are tested in the different regimes, abstraction, 
filtration, and comparison can only work at one particular point in the 
process. 
 
4 See generally, Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the “filtration bandwagon” and widespread adoption of the test). 
5 Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
6 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (explaining the Mayo 
test and applying it to abstract ideas). 
7 Id. at 2357 (“At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of the claim to determine 
whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into 
a patent-eligible application.”). 
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I. ABSTRACTION, FILTRATION, AND COMPARISON 
When two copyrighted works share some similarities but many 
differences, how might infringement be determined? Assume for a 
moment that there is copying: that the accused saw the original work 
and intended to copy from it.8 How similar is too similar? What if the 
similarities are non-literal – that is, they are in plot but not words or just 
a paraphrase? 
Courts struggled with this question,9 but eventually settled on a 
formulation devised by Judge Learned Hand in the Nichols case: 
 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns 
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the 
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most 
general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist 
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where 
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could 
prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his 
property is never extended.10 
 
Of course, Judge Hand did not call it abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison, and as discussed below, it was not until the 1990s that this 
terminology took hold. Indeed, the test was known primarily as the 
Nichols abstractions test.11 However, just a few years prior, the Second 
Circuit had introduced the notion of “dissection.” In Dymow v. Bolton, 
the court held that there could be no infringement where ordinary 
observation showed no similarity. Dymow’s use of dissection bears a 
strong resemblance to our modern understanding of filtration, finding 
that the only similarities between two plots in that case were 
 
8 In copyright law, this is a requirement, though it is often skipped if there is no infringement 
under the abstraction filtration test. Skipping this requirement is convenient here, because patent 
law has no such copying requirement. 
9 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[A]s soon as literal 
appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large, so that... the decisions 
cannot help much in a new case.”). 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“Professor Nimmer suggests that in lieu of the Whelan test of ‘structure, sequence, and 
organization’, a better approach to determining similarities in computer programs can be found 
in the ‘abstractions test’ first enunciated by Learned Hand . . .”). Indeed, Nimmer still calls this 
the abstractions test, and only briefly mentions filtration with respect to computer software. 4 
Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A][1][a] (2018). 
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unprotectable ideas.12 Nichols cites Dymow, but never mentions 
dissection while comparing elements of similarity between the works.  
About fifteen years later, the Second Circuit expanded (and, frankly 
redefined) dissection in more music cases. The opinion in the first case, 
Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, required a dissection, specifically a 
technical analysis that involved breaking the work up into little pieces 
(rather than comparing the whole) to show that it was copied by the 
defendant.13 Thus, the court kept the first part of Dymow’s formulation 
of dissection and ignored the second. In Arnstein v. Porter, the second 
and more famous opinion, the court made clear that dissection was only 
proper in the first stage of infringement analysis: determining whether 
there was copying in the first place.14 Once copying has been 
established, the finder of fact then compares the whole work, with no 
dissection.15 
Arnstein v. Porter’s notion of dissection is at odds with the Nichols 
view of abstraction. Judge Hand assumed copying in Nichols.16 Under 
Porter, then, there should have been no dissection. This means that 
Nichols was either a) applying the Dymow version of dissection, or b) 
applying some test other than dissection. One might think that Arnstein 
v. Porter would have disavowed the Nichols approach, but instead 
Nichols was cited approvingly. 
This left the legacy of Nichols in a state of flux. While it was 
followed, it was not universally loved. Judge Easterbrook noted: 
“Sometimes called the ‘abstractions test’, Hand’s insight is not a ‘test’ 
at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties that require courts to 
avoid either extreme of the continuum of generality. It does little to help 
resolve a given case….”17 Of course, Hand was not blind to this 
difficulty; after laying out his test, he noted: “Nobody has ever been able 
to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”18 
 
12 Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) (“It requires dissection rather than 
observation to discern any resemblance here. If there was copying [which we do not believe], it 
was permissible, because this mere subsection of a plot was not susceptible of copyright.”). 
13 Arnstein v. Broadcast Music Inc., 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1943) (“When we are 
confronted with the fact that similarities between these songs cannot be readily detected by the 
lay ear, nor by the effect of the composition as a whole, but can only be discovered by what 
Judge Hough aptly called ‘dissection,’ we can find no infringement.”), citing Dymow. 
14 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
15 Id. 
16 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1930) (“[W]e may assume, 
arguendo, that in some details the defendant used the plaintiff’s play . . .”). 
17 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990). 
18 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. Whenever I teach Nichols, I show this quote and say to my 
students, “So good luck with that.” 
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The Ninth Circuit made its own attempt to clean up the doctrine. It 
first introduced the term analytic dissection in the landmark case Sid & 
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.19 As discussed 
above, dissection had long been used in copyright, but it is unclear from 
where the Ninth Circuit developed the term “analytic dissection.” This 
was the first reported case to use the term, but the court announces that 
analytic dissection is proper under its new rule with no citation, 
explanation, or other background, as if anyone reading will understand 
what that term means. 
More importantly, the 1977 opinion uses analytic dissection not as a 
threshold test, like Porter, but in a two-part, concurrent analysis similar 
to Dymow. So-called “extrinsic” similarity is an objective comparison 
of the copyrighted and accused works that allows for “analytic 
dissection” by experts to determine which elements were not 
protectable.20 “Intrinsic” similarity is a subjective test by the finder of 
fact, similar to Arnstein v. Porter’s second step.21 The Krofft court cites 
the Porter case, and essentially follows it, finding that the defendants 
may not avoid infringement by extracting out ideas and other 
unprotected aspects before comparison. 
But this was not the end. Other circuits found Krofft and Porter too 
restrictive. In 1982, Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer 
Electronics, Corp., the Seventh Circuit found that filtration-style 
analytic dissection was proper to ensure that only protected expression 
was being compared.22 Krofft was eventually modified in 1987, so that 
similarities could be dissected in the intrinsic test, so that only protected 
expression was compared.23 This was reinforced in 1988, where the court 
applied analytic dissection of similarities to exclude unprotected 
elements.24 And in 1990, the Ninth Circuit again allowed analytic 
dissection, but reverted to making it part of the extrinsic test.25 This is 
 
19 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
20 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1990); Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d at 1164. 
21 Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d at 1164. 
22 Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614-15 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
23 Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[N]o substantial similarity 
may be found under the intrinsic test where analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities 
in expression arise from the use of common ideas.”). 
24 Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208-9 (9th Cir. 1988). 
25 Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Brown 
Bag’s argument ignores the evolution of the ‘extrinsic’ component of the Krofft analysis. 
Properly understood, the district court’s analysis was not a misapplication of the ‘intrinsic test,’ 
but a proper application of the revised ‘extrinsic test.’ Under the reformulated extrinsic test, we 
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more similar to filtration, but it is different from Porter and a complete 
reimagination of Krofft. 
Thus, it took some sixty years for the courts to explicitly note that 
some form of abstraction, filtration, and comparison should take place 
when comparing works.26 It is unclear how the Computer Associates 
Court was swayed to adopt the term “filtration” for the second step. It 
did not appear in any of the briefing. The court appears to have been 
persuaded by David Nimmer, who had suggested using a “successive 
filtering” in his treatise and earlier in a law review article.27 In any event, 
Computer Associates v. Altai still governs how we apply the abstraction-
filtration-comparison test today. 
Despite analytical dissection’s tortured past in other circuits, the 
notion of filtration was new in the Second Circuit. Given that Porter 
was the law of the circuit, it is not surprising that Computer Associates 
instead cited to Ninth Circuit case law28 to justify that “analytic 
dissection” was proper during the comparison stage. In doing so, it ruled 
that computer programs are outside the normal rules of Arnstein v. 
Porter.29 As a result, the rule has been explicitly applied primarily to 
computer programs, though there are some exceptions.30 Nonetheless, 
Nichols remains good law and continues to be cited, so it is unclear 
whether, in complex non-software works, a separate test will always 
apply to other types of expressive works. 
Though there are slight differences across circuits, the basic 
abstraction, filtration, and comparison procedure is the same. First, the 
elements of the work (the court focused on computer software but noted 
that it could apply to other works) should be parsed into their various 
levels of abstraction, from the highest level (the idea) to the lowest (the 
specific expression). Second, those elements are put through the sieve 
of copyrightability. Anything unprotected is removed. In software, the 
court notes that this may include elements dictated by efficiency or 
external factors, but more generally ideas, scenes à faire, and pure fact 
 
mean to perpetuate ‘analytic dissection’ as a tool for comparing not only ideas but also 
expression.”). 
26 Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., No. 762, 1992 WL 139364, at *12 (2d Cir. 
June 22, 1992), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
27 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[F] (2018); David Nimmer et al., A Structured Approach 
to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 
20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625 (1988). 
28 Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992), citing Brown 
Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1990). 
29 Id. at 713. 
30 King Zak Indus., Inc. v. Toys 4 U USA Corp., No. 16-CV-9676 (CS), 2017 WL 6210856, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2017) (discussing application of test). 
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might be filtered. The filtration process leaves behind the “golden 
nuggets”31 of copyrightable expression. The finder of fact then 
compares the remaining expression to the accused work to determine 
infringement. 
When applied this way, the test solved some of Easterbrook’s 
concerns in Nash. Abstraction alone is no test, but the decomposition of 
the work allows the uncopyrightable items to be poked out before two 
works are compared. To be sure, this does not make the comparison step 
any easier; it is still difficult to determine how much copying is too 
much. But using the abstraction-filtration method, at least the finder of 
fact is comparing copying of protected expression rather than 
unprotected ideas. 
It did not take long for the new test to take hold. A district court in 
Colorado cited (and disregarded as a minority view) the initial, 
withdrawn opinion in Computer Associates a mere two days after it 
issued.32 The Tenth Circuit reversed and followed Computer 
Associates.33 Other circuits, though not all, followed suit.34 
Recounting the muddled history of abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison is important for several reasons. First, the historic kinship 
of copyright and patent law described in Sony may not be terribly 
historic.35 Abstraction and filtration is, at most, less than one hundred 
years old. Second, what kinship there is may be unclear in part because 
there is no clear body of law that ties the two together beyond the 
Constitution. Copyright courts and scholars cannot agree about when or 
how to apply abstraction, filtration, and comparison, so garnering 
agreement in patent law may be difficult. 
All is not lost, however. The rise of abstraction and filtration came 
with the growth of expressive works imbued with functional, 
unprotectible aspects: computer software. Whether that development 
started in 1930 or in 1990, the result is the same: courts have special 
concerns about combined subject matter. And, as further explored 
below, these issues also permeate patent law. While there have always 
been business methods patents,36 for example, there is no denying the 
 
31 Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F. 2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992). 
32 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1524 (D. Colo. 1992). 
33 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993). 
34 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. 
v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994). 
35 See also, Peter Menell, The Use and Misuse of Intellectual Property Kinship at the J.L. & 
INNOVATION Symposium at the University of Pennsylvania (April 19, 2018). 
36 Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279 (2012). 
 
2019]      ABSTRACTION, FILTRATION, AND COMPARISON IN PATENT LAW 45 
growth of software patents in the last thirty years,37 and these patents 
are more likely to be abstract. Based on these parallels, the “historic” 
kinship between copyright and patent has something to offer. It is with 
this background that we explore the patent law. 
II. UTILITY PATENT SUBJECT MATTER  
Unlike design patents, utility patents protect useful inventions.38 But 
they do not protect all inventions. Products of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas may not be protected.39 When the Court 
announced these limitations, there were no cases that directly tackled 
these subject matters. Instead, patentable subject matter was a series of 
cases that rejected patent claims using different language and focusing 
on other problems of patentability.40 It was not until 2012, in Mayo v. 
Prometheus, that the Court settled on some sort of regularized test of 
patentable subject matter with respect to natural phenomena.41 Two 
years later, the Court stated the test more succinctly while applying it to 
abstract ideas:42 
 
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of 
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, what else is there in 
the claims before us? To answer that question, we consider the elements 
of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to 
determine whether the additional elements transform the nature of the 
claim into a patent-eligible application. We have described step two of 
this analysis as a search for an inventive concept — i.e., an element or 
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible 
concept itself.43 
 
This test was not entirely new, despite the mish-mosh of cases to 
come before. Instead, the notion of “inventive concept” had been 
 
37 James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 241 (2012). 
38 35 U.S.C. §101. 
39 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
40 See generally, Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008). 
41 Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
42 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). The test does not seem 
to apply to products of nature, and this essay does not address them. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (not citing Prometheus in 
determining eligibility); Dan Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad 
Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 541 (2014). 
43 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
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introduced in a 1948 case44 and then renamed “post-solution activity” in 
a later case.45 But it was an attempt to solve a longstanding problem in 
patentable subject matter jurisprudence. 
That problem is simple to identify, but extremely difficult to solve: 
every invention, at bottom, is in some sense a natural phenomenon or 
abstract idea, and so separating unpatentable ideas and phenomena from 
patentable ones requires judgment calls. The two-step test attempts to 
solve this problem by identifying whether the elements claimed in 
addition to the unpatentable subject matter are enough to warrant 
eligibility for protection. 
Regardless of the level of abstraction chosen, courts are necessarily 
performing filtration and comparison as they go about applying the 
second Prometheus-Alice step.46 Once the essence of the claim has been 
determined via abstraction, it is essentially filtered out, no longer to be 
considered part of the patentable subject matter. The reasons for this 
filtering are not so clear cut as in copyright. Some cases call it 
preemption.47 Some assume that natural phenomena or abstract ideas are 
part of the prior art.48 Others just say such material is unpatentable as a 
matter of history.49 Regardless, the parallels with copyright are 
straightforward: that which is unpatentable should be excluded. 
The comparison step is not so straightforward, though it is parallel. 
Once the unpatentable has been filtered, the remaining claim elements 
are compared with “conventional” solutions. If the elements are new 
and different from the conventional, then the subject matter is eligible. 
If, however, little remains but the conventional, then the subject matter 
is not patent eligible. 
Breaking the Prometheus-Alice test into its copyright-like parts 
illustrates the difficulties associated with the method. Beginning with 
the level of abstraction, as noted above, the choice can have an outsized 
effect on what is filtered. As a first matter, it is unclear why there must 
be a single level of abstraction. The genius of the copyright test is that 
multiple levels of abstraction are separated, and uncopyrightable 
 
44 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
45 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A 
History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015) for a thorough historical treatment of this test. 
46 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Rather, the 
‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, 
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’”); 
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 720 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing “coarse filter” 
approach to patentable subject matter). 
47 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
48 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591. 
49 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 625 (2010). 
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elements are filtered at each level so that the remaining pieces — from 
abstract to literal — can be compared and analyzed. By forcing patents 
into a single level of abstraction, the error rate is much higher, because 
valuable information about the patent claim is removed at the 
abstraction stage rather than the filtration stage. 
Thus, if the level of abstraction is set too broadly, then too much of 
the invention is filtered out. Consider, for example, Davenport’s electric 
motor: “Applying magnetic and electro-magnetic power as a moving 
principle for machinery in the manner above described, or in any other 
substantially the same in principle.”50 At the lowest level of abstraction 
it is a motor, which is decidedly not abstract. Little is filtered, and the 
motor is a big inventive leap from the conventional. At the highest level 
of abstraction, it is the natural phenomenon that electricity running 
through a coil wrapped around a magnet will cause the magnet to spin. 
Once this is filtered out, little remains but actually running current 
through a wire, which was conventional, even in 1837.51 
In this sense, the level of abstraction is orthogonal to that of 
copyright. In copyright, abstraction at a high level leaves more to be 
compared, but that comparison is specific expression. With patents, 
abstraction at a high level leaves less to be compared, because the idea 
often subsumes the specific elements of the patent claim. In the electric 
motor, for example, abstracting to the level of wire coiled around a 
magnet eliminates the specifics: wire and a magnet. To the extent that 
the wire and magnet were new, non-obvious, unconventional, difficult 
to implement, or otherwise inventive, they are lost in the abstraction of 
the general idea. 
The difficulties of abstraction in this framework have been well 
studied even before Prometheus,52 and solutions to it have been 
proposed.53 Under the current two-step test, selection of the proper level 
of abstraction can mean the difference between eligibility or not. 
 
50 U.S. Patent No. 132 (issued Feb. 25, 1837). 
51 RICHARD PHILLIPS, A MILLION OF FACTS, AND CORRECT DATA, IN THE ENTIRE CIRCLE 
OF THE SCIENCES, AND ON ALL SUBJECTS OF SPECULATION AND PRACTICE: ADAPTED TO THE 
CLOSET AND THE ACTIVE WORLD 432–34 (1833) (describing Faraday’s and others’ experiments 
with electricity and magnetism), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=524y_35YY1gC. 
52 Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1097 (2011); Mark R. Carter, Copyright’s Hand Abstractions Test for Patent’s Section 101 
Subject-Matter Eligibility, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 469 (2014); Michael Risch, 
Nothing is Patentable, 67 FL. L. REV. FORUM 45 (2015). 
53 Risch, supra note 40; Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, 
Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011). 
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Depending on any given court’s selected level, some of our most famous 
inventions might suddenly become abstract ideas.54 
Even if the difficulties of abstraction are solved, filtration also 
presents challenges. Filtration asks the court to consider patent claims 
at the point of novelty, rather than consider them as a whole. From the 
time since Diamond v. Diehr,55 courts have been instructed to consider 
patent claims as a whole. Even the Court in Alice repeats the mantra that 
the entire claim should be considered.56 Indeed the Court then went on 
to characterize a very particular process for handling escrow as the 
abstract idea of “intermediated settlement.”57 From there, the Court 
ruled that all that remained after filtering would “merely require generic 
computer implementation.”58 In other words, though the Court gave lip 
service to considering the whole claim, it did so by finding the gist of 
the patent.59 
The practical result is that courts engage in little filtering. They 
typically determine the gist of the claim, which is dispositive. Cases are 
won and lost in the high stakes abstraction phase, as cases that find the 
claim to be abstract/natural and then add something unconventional are 
exceedingly rare. 
If Prometheus-Alice two-step test is to continue, courts should better 
calibrate their abstraction and filtration steps by abandoning the fiction 
that they are examining claims as a whole. Rather than simply 
identifying the gist of the claim, during step one the court should instead 
focus on the ideas or phenomena at play. This would be true in any 
claim. But that abstraction, once filtered, would leave much more 
remaining for comparison. 
Judges, lawyers, and commentators might protest that courts are 
already undertaking this fine-grained analysis, but they are not. Courts 
are caught in the cycle of trying to identify what whole claims mean 
when those claims clearly have specific elements. Even the recent case 
 
54 Risch, supra note 52, at 53. 
55 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
56 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (“To answer that 
question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered 
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ 
into a patent-eligible application.”). 
57 Id. at 2356. 
58 Id. at 2357. 
59 SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(disapproving of the use of “gist” of the patent for determining factual questions); see also, 
Lemley, supra note 2, at 1279 (discussing difficulties associated with point of novelty analysis 
in patentable subject matter). 
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Berkheimer v. HP60 — in which the Federal Circuit recognized that 
courts should do a better job analyzing step two — simplified a patent 
claim to a very broad and general idea rather than considering each 
specific element’s abstractness.61 
The comparison stage is also troublesome. A primary problem, of 
course, is merely an extension of filtration. When the right level of 
abstraction is selected, comparison is often rendered moot. Secondary, 
though, is the difficulty in determining what constitutes a sufficient 
inventive step, including what is routine, well-known, or conventional. 
The Federal Circuit recently recognized this problem, ruling that — at 
least in some cases — this determination is a question of fact, and that 
mere presence in the prior art is insufficient.62 
A more deliberate comparison step should define the threshold 
necessary to determine what is a sufficient inventive step. But that 
comparison should also operate differently than an anticipation or 
obviousness analysis. Instead, the goal of the comparison should be to 
determine whether the non-abstract (or non-natural) elements constitute 
an application of the natural principle.63 Such a comparison would take 
a detailed look at those elements of the claim that were not filtered out, 
something that rarely happens now. It would consider whether those 
elements are, in the words of Mayo, “more than simply [] the law of 
nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’”64 While the Court called this 
an inventive step, the heart of the analysis was to determine whether the 
claims did something “more” than the unpatentable.65 Abstraction, 
filtration, and comparison is well suited for this, though courts are not 
actually performing this comparison. 
Thus, courts are implicitly performing abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison in utility patent subject matter. But they aren’t doing so 
deliberately or optimally. If courts are to continue with their current 
subject matter jurisprudence,66 then they should more deliberately learn 
 
60 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
61 Id. at 1368 (holding that a claim including parsing, comparing, and presenting differences 
for reconciliation to be “directed to the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data”). 
62 Id. at 1369 (“Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled 
artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination. Whether a particular technology is 
well-understood, routine, and conventional goes beyond what was simply known in the prior art. 
The mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art, for example, does not mean it 
was well-understood, routine, and conventional.”). 
63 Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Lemley, supra note 2; 
Lemley et al., supra note 53. 
64 Mayo Collaborative, 566 U.S. at 72. 
65 Id. at 72-73. 
66 This is a contested point. Risch, supra note 40. 
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from the lessons of copyright to filter out only those specific elements that 
are unpatentable, and then compare what remains with common or 
conventional elements to ensure that what remains is an application of the 
unpatentable, rather than simply a repetition of it. 
III. DESIGN PATENT SUBJECT MATTER 
Design patents protect non-useful aesthetic product designs: “Whoever 
invents any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture may obtain a patent therefore . . .”67 An “article of 
manufacture” can include an entire product for sale, or just a portion of 
it.68 As a result, an infringing device could look nothing like the original, 
so long as the (potentially very small) portion — for example, the shank 
of a drill bit — that happens to be patented is infringed. 
Design patents afford their owners much stronger protection than 
copyrights,69 not the least of which is that one can infringe without ever 
copying, let alone seeing, the original.70 Any use of the design brings 
liability, and there is no independent development defense. Any 
infringement brings liability, without regard to any fair or other equitable 
use defense.71 
This stronger protection is coupled with two offsetting rules designed 
to mitigate unfair application of design patents on unsuspecting 
defendants. First, because the protection is stronger, the duration is much 
shorter. Protection lasts for fourteen years from the date the patent is 
granted.72 Second, design patents are still patents. They must survive the 
rigors of patent examination. Only those designs that are novel and 
nonobvious may be granted. These rigors tend to be more illusory than 
protective, however. One study found that the PTO grants 90% of design 
patent applications,73 with an average pendency of merely 15 months.74 
 
67 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2011). 
68 Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016) (“[T]he term ‘article 
of manufacture’ is broad enough to embrace both a product sold to a consumer and a component 
of that product, whether sold separately or not.”). 
69 But see Sarah Burstein, Not (Necessarily) Narrower: Rethinking the Relative Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Designs, 3 IP THEORY 114 (2013) (arguing that design patents do not 
necessarily provide stronger protection than copyright). 
70 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2011) (defining copyright infringement as violation of a right, 
for example, to make copies), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011) (outlawing the making, using, or 
selling of an infringing product). 
71 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011). 
72 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2011). 
73 Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights, RESEARCH 
PAPER NO. 2010-17 *18 (Missouri Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2010). 
74 Id. at *20. 
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Forty-five percent of design patent applications had a pendency less than 
one year.75 In contrast, the average pendency of utility patents during the 
same time period was more than four years for the most common filing 
type.76 
Some of the reduced pendency may be due to a better application-to-
examiner ratio for design patents. But even with this worker advantage, 
the examination process should be adding work. Design patents tend to 
cite a lot of prior art,77 and examiners added more than half of that prior 
art from their own searches.78 
Despite finding so much prior art,79 examiners almost never reject 
based on prior art. First, design patents, including GUI patents that are 
examined slightly more closely, rarely face a rejection during prosecution. 
A study of design patent examination found that only 13% of design patent 
applications received any rejection at all, with a slightly higher percentage 
of 19% for graphical user interface patents.80 The other 80+% issue with 
no rejection whatsoever. Non-GUI design patents are virtually never 
rejected; in a sample from 1996 until the 2011, only 3.37% of all rejections 
were for novelty or obviousness, and of those, no final rejection in the 
sample group cited novelty or obviousness.81 For graphical user interface 
patents, fewer than 15% of all rejections were based on non-novelty or 
obviousness.82 
With respect to subject matter, the study found that, in its sample, there 
were almost no rejections for functionality in a 15-year sample, including 
in graphical user interface and animated design patents.83 This is 
unsurprising given the history and current interpretation of the statute.  
 
75 Id. 
76 Dennis Crouch, Update on Patent Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 30, 2010, 6:43 AM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/04/average-pendancy-of-utility-patents-issued-april-27-
2010claim-priority-to-foreign-applicationyesnoclaim-priority-to-us-no.html. 
77 20.6 mean references, 13 median. 
78 11 mean references, 9 median. These counts reflect all issued patents between 2005 and 
2012. Data on file with author. The number of references cited has increased with time. Jason J. 
Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107, 144 (2013). 
79 Examiners add only 34% of the references for utility patents. Id. at 148 n. 181 (citing 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Citations Matter?, 42 
RES. POL’Y 844, 846 (2013)). Even so, utility patents are rejected for novelty and obviousness 
much more frequently. Id. at 153 (noting study showing 86% of utility patents receive at least 
one novelty or obviousness rejection). 
80 Du Mont & Janis, supra note 78, at 153. 
81 Id. at 155. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 155–56. 
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The first design patent statute, enacted in 1842, envisioned protection 
for novel drawings and images incorporated into articles of manufacture.84 
The protection was extremely important for design protection at the time, 
because drawings, paintings, and photographs were not protected under 
the Copyright Act until 1870.85 
Meanwhile, the language of the design patent statute caused great 
distress. Because it protected “useful” designs, inventors obtained design 
patents on new shapes for well-known useful inventions. In Ex parte 
Crane,86 the first decision to interpret this part of the statute, the 
Commissioner of Patents stated: 
 
The line of distinction between what is useful and what is merely 
ornamental is, in some cases, very indefinite. By some it is said that any 
form or design that is most useful, is also most pleasing. It would be 
impossible, in the view of such persons, to make any improvement in 
utility that did not at the same time add to the ornamental and artistic. 
 
I can perceive no necessity for the distinction. There is a large class of 
improvements in manufactured articles that are not regarded as new 
inventions, or as coming within the scope of general patent laws. They add 
to the market value and salability of such articles, and often result from 
the exercise of much labor, genius, and expense. They promote the best 
interests of the country, as well as the creations of inventive talent. It seems 
to me to have been the intent of Congress to extend to all such cases a 
limited protection and encouragement. Whenever there shall be produced 
by the exercise of industry, genius, effort and expense, any new and 
original design, form, configuration or arrangement of a manufactured 
article, it comes within the provisions and objects of the act creating 
design patents, whatever be its nature, and whether made for ornament 
merely, or intended to promote convenience and utility.87 
 
84 Patent Act of Aug. 29, 1842, § 3, 5 Stat. 543 (protecting any “new and useful pattern, or 
print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or cast or otherwise 
fixed on, any article of manufacture . . .”). 
85 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 85-111, 16 Stat. 198, 212-16; Donald M. Millinger, 
Copyright and the Fine Artist, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354, 356 (1980); cf. Copyright, 3 AM. L. 
REV. 453, 454-55 (1869) (“It was also contended that [the infringed stage play scenes], were not 
of a literary, but of a mechanical order, and not subject to the protection of the Statute of 
Copyright; and that the scene . . . must be protected by . . . design patents for the scenery and 
properties.”). 
86 Ex parte Crane, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat 7 (patent granted on new arrangement of product 
that had already been denied a utility patent as non-novel). 
87 Id. at 7-9; see also Ex parte Bartholemew, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 103, 103 (“In thus 
denying that a new ‘shape or configuration’ of an article, whereby utility or convenience is 
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This ruling led to the rise of so-called “patent sharks” that would 
extract payments from unsuspecting farmers using farm equipment that 
looked similar to new designs.88 
In 1902, the Commissioner of Patents requested that Congress 
eliminate the word “useful” from the statute, noting that design patents 
were never intended to protect functional equipment.89 Instead, the word 
“ornamental” was introduced into the statute, where it has remained until 
today. 
Early courts struggled with the amendment, but quickly settled on a 
rule that also still applies: if a design is primarily ornamental, then the fact 
that it has some functional elements will not disqualify it from protection.90 
If a design is solely functional, then it must be protected, if at all, by a 
utility patent. However, courts rarely make distinctions about different 
types of functionality, and they have long held that where functionality and 
ornamentality mix, a design patent may issue so long as the design is not 
dictated by functionality.91 The number of cases invalidating patents is far 
outweighed by the number of cases allowing them. 
 
promoted, is the proper subject of a patent, under the acts referred to, the office would seem to 
have involved itself in the absurdity that if a design is useless it may be patented, whereas if it 
be useful it is entitled to no protection. Fortunately . . . office is relieved from so grievous an 
imputation . . . Articles have been, and are being constantly, patented as designs which possess 
no element of the artistic or ornamental, but are valuable solely because, by a new shape or 
configuration, they possess more utility than the prior forms of like articles.”). 
88 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1820-21 (2007); see also USPTO, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS FOR THE YEAR 1871, at 17 (1872) (“Very many design 
patents, which cannot, under the law, be denied, are a fraud upon the public. A man applies for 
a patent on a cultivator, or hammer, or any other useful tool or device, and finding himself fully 
anticipated in every principle and useful feature of his invention, abandons his application and 
at once applies for a design patent for the same thing. This application he bases upon some 
peculiarity of form or color, having nothing whatever to do with the merits or demerits of the 
article itself; and not being anticipated in these respects, a patent is granted for the new design. 
The patent gives him no protection whatever, except as to the form or color upon which it is 
based.”). 
89 S. REP. NO. 57-1139, at 2-3 (1902). 
90 Mygatt v. Zalinski, 138 F. 88, 89 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905) (“That it is useful as well as 
ornamental does not affect its patentability as a design patent.”); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 
Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he design claim is not invalid, 
even if certain elements have functional purposes.”). Compare Ashley v. Weeks-Numan Co., 
220 F. 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1915) (“[W]e declare that the subject-matter of a patent is not rendered 
unfit as a design patent by the mere fact that it is possible somewhere in its construction to 
discover a mechanical function.”), with Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“However, if the design claimed in a design patent is dictated solely by 
the function of the article of manufacture, the patent is invalid because the design is not 
ornamental.”). 
91 Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (design of 
concrete stamp ornamental, even though its sole function is to stamp concrete of the same shape); 
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Thus, Federal Circuit precedent allows design patents that incorporate 
functional elements, unless the design embodies the function or unless the 
function is essential to the use of the product.92 But design patents do not 
require a use, making the test difficult. Designs that might be functional in 
one context, say a key blade designed to fit a type of lock,93 become 
completely ornamental when hung as a necklace pendant or used as a 
(dangerous) toy.94 Determinations of functionality in a market must 
depend, at least in part, on how the product will be used.95 Patentees can 
almost always point to some ornamental aspect that is unrelated to a 
particular use. 
Thus, the current subject matter rule functionality rule tilts toward 
patentability. The defendant must prove functionality by clear and 
convincing evidence,96 and if design alternatives exist, courts will not find 
functionality,97 presumably even if all the alternatives are patented. This is 
a distinct departure from copyright, where few design alternatives will bar 
protection under the merger doctrine. As a result, a combination of 
elements, each of which might serve some utilitarian purpose, can be 
 
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Carletti, 
328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Robert W. Brown & Co., Inc. v. De Bell, 243 F.2d 200, 
202-03 (9th Cir. 1957) (“While it is the design which is patented, it is immaterial that the subject 
of the design may embody a functional or utilitarian purpose.”); In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 
424 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (holding that utilitarian objects may be protected with design patents, so 
long as someone cares about their ornamentation). 
92 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (design of key 
blade functional because no other shape would work in lock); Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear 
Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Thom McAn, 988 F.2d at 1123 (“If the particular 
design is essential to the use of the article, it can not be the subject of a design patent.”). 
93 Best Lock, 94 F.3d at 1566. 
94 See, e.g., Du Mont & Janis, supra note 78, at 165 (t-shirt can infringe GUI patent since 
patent covers only the image and is not limited to a display screen). Consider Irwin Mainway’s 
Bag o’ Glass and Teddy Chainsaw Bear, both of which have dual function/playtime uses. See 
Saturday Night Live: Consumer Probe (NBC television broadcast Dec. 11, 1976), available at 
https://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/irwin-mainway/n8641, transcript available at 
SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE TRANSCRIPTS, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180121035746/http://snltranscripts.jt.org/76/76jconsumerprobe.
phtml (last visited July 28, 2018). 
95 37 CFR § 1.153 (2012) requires that the title and claim each identify the article of 
manufacture. However, broad leeway is given to describe use of the article, so long as it is clear 
what the article is. MPEP § 1503.01 ¶ 15.05 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) (“An acceptable title 
would be ‘door for cabinets, houses, or the like,’ while the title ‘door or the like’ would be 
unacceptable . . .”). Thus, “Key Design for locks, necklaces, or toys” would be acceptable. 
96 Thom McAn, 988 F.2d at 1123. Presumably, the examiner could reject functional designs 
using a lower evidentiary standard, but this virtually never happens. 
97 Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Avia, 853 F.2d 
at 1563; Thom McAn, 988 F.2d at 1123; see, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 920 F. 
Supp. 2d 1079, 1091-92 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (ruling that jury need not have been instructed about 
functional elements because alternate designs were available). 
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protected as a group if the design in the entirety is primarily ornamental 
rather than functional.98 As such, only the lowest level of abstraction is 
ever considered with design patents; courts do not ask about the primary 
focus of the patent to determine subject matter.99 As discussed in the next 
section, courts treat utility patents differently. 
The result is that design patents are virtually never rejected, not during 
prosecution, and not in court. This leaves competitors in a difficult 
position. Their product (or parts of it) may look like the patented design 
because they perform the same function. How are they to convince the 
court that the functional similarities should be allowed? Where does 
functionality end and ornamentality begin? 
Patent law currently has few answers. The rule for design infringement 
is like that in copyright law: similarity. With design patents, infringement 
determinations are made by comparing the accused device with the design 
patent, to see whether the ordinary observer familiar with all the prior 
designs in that field would believe that the accused product is substantially 
the same as the claimed design.100 The designs need not be exact; they need 
only be similar enough that the ordinary observer would find similarity.101 
As noted above, this standard can be easier to meet than copyright 
because there need be no proof of copying. Furthermore, current law 
includes neither the newer abstraction-filtration-comparison test, nor even 
the older Nichols-type abstraction test. Design patent infringement rules 
do not allow for focus on just those elements that are new, the so-called 
“point of novelty” of the design.102 
But the design patent rule could allow for filtration. For example, 
elements associated with the prior art might be filtered somewhat. After 
all, the ordinary observer is expected to know the prior art, and to consider 
 
98 Thom McAn, 988 F.2d at 1123; see also Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 
1189 (Fed. Cir. 1988). But see Barofsky v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(“[B]ecause the dominant features of the design [for a cabinet door], and therefore the design as 
a whole, are primarily functional, this is not a valid design patent.”). 
99 Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F. 3d 1312, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We 
explained that a claimed design was not invalid as functional simply because the ‘primary 
features’ of the design could perform functions. [] As with its analysis on other validity grounds, 
the district court used ‘too a high a level of abstraction’ in assessing the scope of the claimed 
design.”). 
100 Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (“[I]f, in the eye of an 
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are 
substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him 
to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”); 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
101 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672-73. 
102 Id. 
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similarities that are based on preexisting designs.103 Indeed, some courts 
have also filtered out functional elements when testing for design patent 
infringement.104 Such filtration would expressly protect ornamental 
elements, but not functional ones. 
An example may be helpful. Consider Design Patent No. D604,305,105 
owned by Apple, Inc., pictured below. The patent claims a screen for an 
electronic device with icons presented on it. The icons are square with 
rounded corners, and they are tiled four across. The patent includes a row 
of four icons at the bottom of the screen. In the actual device, we know 
that these bottom icons — presumably those most favored by the user — 
remain the same, no matter what screen one looks at. Of course, the patent 
does not require that the icons stay the same from screen to screen. It only 
requires the icons to be on a gray background at the bottom. Samsung 
developed a competing interface for its smartphones. Apple sued 
Samsung, and a jury found that Samsung’s user interface (commonly 
called “Touch Wiz”) infringed this design patent.106 
 
Figure 1: Samsung TouchWiz (left) compared with D604,305 (right) 
 
103 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672. 
104 See, e.g., Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F. 3d 1288, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(court filtered out functional elements in bench trial); OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 
122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (construing claim narrowly: “[T]hese functional 
characteristics do not invalidate the design patent, but merely limit the scope of the protected 
subject matter.”); Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Thus 
it is the non-functional, design aspects[s] that are pertinent to determinations of infringement.”). 
105 U.S. Patent No. D604,305 (filed June 23, 2007). 
106 Amended Verdict Form, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012), ECF No. 1931, available at 
http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/ApplevSamsung-1931.pdf. 
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At the time of patent application filing, 2007, Apple’s design might 
have been novel, ornamental and not dictated by functionality. After all, 
the look of the screen does not do anything when viewed. Furthermore, 
icons need not be rounded, and the icons at the bottom need not have a 
different color. At a time when few other devices had a touch screen that 
would accommodate finger taps and gestures, the combination of elements 
on this screen may have been an “ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.”107 
But pieces of the design must have been driven by functional 
considerations. The bottom row “dock” is especially troubling because 
functionality might dictate a different color for a set of icons that does not 
change from screen to screen. Because the design patent does not claim 
any functional features, it presents as if the color is merely ornamental 
because the context of a working graphical user interface is missing. But 
any user of the iPhone, indeed any user of computer software, knows 
better. 
There was also significant prior art. The idea of a fixed area using 
different coloring that held frequently used programs was not terribly new 
in 2007. Microsoft had used something similar since Windows 95,108 and 
many “quick launch” program docks were available, and those docks were 
all a different color than the background.109 RIM had introduced icons in 
rows on its Blackberry devices years before the iPhone was released,110 
and Nokia had even provided an interface with square icons aligned in 
rows.111 Of course, one had to scroll through the icons rather than touch 
them, but the arrangement only made scrolling easier. Scrolling is also 
irrelevant, because this is a design patent — only the appearance matters. 
Further, Adobe had used square icons with rounded corners for so long 
that it abandoned them before Apple even applied for its patent.112 The 
 
107 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2011). 
108 See Windows 95 Taskbar Screenshot, WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Windows_95_taskbar_screenshot.png.  
109 See, e.g., Starfish Software’s Sidekick 95, TELECOMMANDER.COM, 
http://www.telecommander.com/pics/links/application%20software/corel/Corel%20Office%20
Pro%20V7/Corel%20Office%20Professional%20V7.htm (last visited July 29, 2018). 
110 Bruce Brown, RIM BlackBerry 7230 Review & Rating, PCMAG.COM (Oct. 1, 2003), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1265089,00.asp; see also Du Mont & Janis, supra note 
78, at 129–30 (noting that RIM’s design patent for rows of icons is one of the most cited design 
patents). 
111 Marek Lutonsky, Nokia 6681 Review: Extra Style, GSMARENA.COM (May 8, 2005), 
http://www.gsmarena.com/nokia_6681-review-38p3.php. 
112 Prescott Perez-Fox, Out with the Old, PRESCOTT’S DESIGN BLOG (Dec. 17, 2006, 2:14 
PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20101118104542/http://www.perezfox.com/2006/12/17/out-
with-the-old (last visited July 29, 2018). 
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Federal Government had even recommended square icons with rounded 
corners for icons in vehicle displays.113 
However, it is difficult to argue that Apple’s entire design is functional 
or in the prior art. Only some of the basic ideas and other aspects are 
functional or preexisting. For example, courts should not let a competitor 
reuse the exact icons, in the exact order, of those in the patented design. 
The difficulty is determining which designs that are not identical should 
infringe. This case provides an excellent vehicle to show abstraction-
filtration-and comparison because Apple argued that Samsung’s use of 
high level abstractions were infringing, and won. 
The Touch Wiz interface shown in Figure 1 is not an exact copy of the 
Apple design. In many ways, it is not even close. The icons are different. 
They are different colors. They are in a different order, and there are more 
of them. The background is a different color. The icons that were similar 
were driven by functional requirements, like the color green, the shape of 
a handset (which was not new to Apple), and a clock. Though it is 
technically irrelevant, the functions of the icons on the dock were different. 
Given these differences, Apple argued that the idea of the design was the 
same. One of the case exhibits is reproduced below; it makes Apple’s 
strategy clear.114 
Figure 2: Exhibit showing levels of abstraction in Apple GUI design 
 
 
113 See FEDERAL HIGHWAYS ADMINISTRATION, IN-VEHICLE DISPLAY ICONS AND OTHER 
INFORMATION ELEMENTS, VOLUME I: GUIDELINES, FHWA-RD-03-065, 4-4 (2004), available 
at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/03065/03065.pdf. 
114 Exhibit A of Samsung’s Submission in Response to Aug. 2 Order at 3, Apple, Inc. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012), ECF No. 1565-1. 
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Apple argued that Samsung infringed because it used a grid, rounded 
rectangles, mixes of icon styles, colorful icons, and a bottom row with 
offsetting background. These are functions — ideas, ergonomics, and 
operations. They are not the design themselves. To be sure, there is some 
similarity in the structure, sequence, and organization, but it is the structure 
and selection of different design elements. 
Based on the differences between the claim and the accused display, 
the only way Samsung could infringe would be at a higher level of 
abstraction — the structure and sequence itself. Abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison is perfectly suited for the task. Apple had already done some 
abstracting. The next step is filtration. The first level to be removed is the 
rounded rectangle; it already existed in the prior art. Similarly, lining the 
icons in a grid would be filtered. This is in the prior art, and functional as 
well. Third, the court might consider filtering the notion of colorful icons 
unless the express designs were too similar. Not only did such icons exist, 
but on a color screen such icons would be functional. Similarly, while a 
particular mix of icon styles might be protected, the idea of a mix of icon 
styles would be filtered as functional. In a screen display (which is claimed 
here), it would make no sense for all the icons to be identical. A primary 
remaining feature is the bottom row with offsetting colors. This too might 
see some filtering for the idea of an offsetting color (which is in the prior 
art), but the prior art is not terribly similar to Apple’s claimed look and that 
might remain in large part. 
This type of filtering could have been achieved under current Federal 
Circuit guidance. The court would have instructed the jury a) not to 
consider elements of the prior art or functionality (of which these examples 
would have been submitted), and b) but that it should consider as a whole 
the ornamental parts of the design in light of those elements. Such an 
instruction would not fully exclude any part of the design, but would also 
make the jury cognizant that it should be focused on the novel, non-
functional design as it compared the two. In other words, the jury would 
receive an explicit instruction to consider the ornamental features as a 
whole in light of the unprotectability of some of the features. 
Instead, the court provided no jury instruction about functionality at 
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The D’305 Patent claims the ornamental design for a graphical user 
interface for a display screen or portion thereof, as shown in Figures 1-2. 
The broken line showing of a display screen in both views forms no part 
of the claimed design.115 
 
While the jury instructions allowed the jury to consider the prior art, 
there is no mention whatsoever that infringement cannot be based on 
functional elements, even though the Federal Circuit had affirmed other 
courts who had so construed patents. 
While Apple, and perhaps the conventional wisdom, believe that 
Android “copied” the iPhone GUI patent, this was not slavish copying. 
Furthermore, many of the aspects that were copied were the functional and 
non-novel aspects. Liability here seems premised on the notion that using 
the same ideas infringed. This seems to violate the maxim — in use today 
even as applied to design patents — “[t]hat which infringes, if after, would 
anticipate, if earlier.”116 It is unlikely that any court would say that 
Samsung’s interface would render Apple’s patent non-novel or obvious if 
it predated it;117 Apple would surely claim that the functionality is similar, 
but the actual design differs from the Samsung design in important ways, 
such as all of the icons having different images.118 And if the Apple patent 
would be allowed even if Samsung’s design were prior art, then Samsung 
should not be considered infringing. Abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison helps achieve a consistent result. 
For another example, consider Richardson v. Stanley Works.119 In that 
case, the Federal Circuit compared a multipurpose hammer to a design 
patent. On the surface, there were many similarities, but many of those 
similarities were driven by functionality. The court noted: 
 
 
115 Final Jury Instructions, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK, *60 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012), ECF No. 1903, available at 
http://groklaw.net/pdf3/ApplevSamsung-1903.pdf. 
116 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Peters v. Active Manuf’g Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889)) (“Moreover, it has been well 
established for over a century that the same test must be used for both infringement and 
anticipation.”). Compare Int’l Seaway Trading, 589 F.3d at 1239 (finding that Crocs patent does 
not anticipate plaintiff’s patent despite relatively small differences), with Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding infringement of Crocs patent 
despite relatively small differences from accused clogs). 
117 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011). 
118 Int’l Seaway Trading, 589 F.3d at 1242 (slight differences in dimpling pattern on show 
insole sufficient to avoid invalidity due to lack of novelty or obviousness). 
119 Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F. 3d 1288, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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The district court here properly factored out the functional aspects of 
Richardson’s design as part of its claim construction. By definition, the 
patented design is for a multi-function tool that has several functional 
components, and we have made clear that a design patent, unlike a utility 
patent, limits protection to the ornamental design of the article . . .  [W]hen 
the design also contains ornamental aspects, it is entitled to a design patent 
whose scope is limited to those aspects alone and does not extend to any 
functional elements of the claimed article.120 
 
The appeals court thus affirmed the district court’s judgment of non-
infringement after a bench trial. The differing posture of the case is 
important, as the non-jury trial allowed the court some leeway in how it 




Figure 3: The competing multipurpose hammers 
 
In reality, filtration is much more difficult to achieve under current 
practices. The Federal Circuit has limited the reach of prior cases that 
seemed to filter,121 although the court has continued to rule that 
functionality can narrow a claim.122 Compounding this issue, because all 
 
120 Id. at 1293-94. 
121 Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F. 3d 1312, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(“Thus, although the Design Patents do not protect the general design concept of an open trigger, 
torque knob, and activation button in a particular configuration, they nevertheless have some 
scope—the particular ornamental designs of those underlying elements.”); Sport Dimension, 
Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 820 F. 3d 1316, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (refusing to eliminate functional 
elements with little ornamentation: “By eliminating structural elements from the claim, the 
district court improperly converted the claim scope of the design patent from one that covers the 
overall ornamentation to one that covers individual elements. Here, the district court erred by 
completely removing the armbands and side torso tapering from its construction.”); Apple Inc. 
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 786 F. 3d 983, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“As such, the language 
‘dictated by their functional purpose’ in Richardson was only a description of the facts there; it 
did not establish a rule to eliminate entire elements from the claim scope as Samsung argues.”). 
122 Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 820 F.3d at 1323. 
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prior art and functionality are submitted to the jury, any filtration is 
invisible to the record and thus nearly invulnerable to appeal.123 
Furthermore, while judges are willing to filter out functional elements in 
bench trials, they are less willing to do so for jury trials, again leaving such 
determinations unreviewable.124 
The primary objection facing application of abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison is the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the point of novelty test in 
Egyptian Goddess.125 But this need not be a barrier. As the Court made 
clear: 
 
Our rejection of the point of novelty test does not mean, of course, that the 
differences between the claimed design and prior art designs are irrelevant. 
To the contrary, examining the novel features of the claimed design can be 
an important component of the comparison of the claimed design with the 
accused design and the prior art. But the comparison of the designs, 
including the examination of any novel features, must be conducted as part 
of the ordinary observer test, not as part of a separate test focusing on 
particular points of novelty that are designated only in the course of 
litigation.126 
 
Judges should retake a gatekeeping role and filter in every case. 
Modifying the above quote to add “functionality” would continue to apply 
the court’s ordinary observer test while also mandating that district courts 
inform juries about functional elements. This is not only consistent with 
Egyptian Goddess, it is expressly contemplated by it.127 Given the clear 
guidance in Egyptian Goddess and follow-up cases that filtering of 
functionality will be helpful to the factfinder, as a matter of policy it seems 
odd to leave the question to the discretion of the court either to not mention 
functionality at all, or to give no guidance.128 
 
123 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1089-90 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(adopting deferential standard to jury verdict and assuming jury weighed all prior art). 
124 Id. at 1090-91 (“The cases do not suggest that this type of claim construction is 
appropriate when instructing a jury.”). The district court was affirmed. Apple Inc. v. Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd., 786 F. 3d at 998–99. 
125 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F. 3d 665, 677–78 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
126 Id. at 678. 
127 Id. at 680 (“[A] trial court can usefully guide the finder of fact by addressing a number 
of other issues that bear on the scope of the claim. Those include . . . distinguishing between 
those features of the claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely functional. 
Providing an appropriate measure of guidance to a jury without crossing the line and unduly 
invading the jury’s fact-finding process is a task that trial courts are very much accustomed to . 
. . .” [citations omitted]). 
128 Indeed, leaving filtering to the jury without guidance requires the appellate court to guess 
whether any filtering took place to determine whether there was substantial evidence of 
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This is not to say that instructing a jury will be easy. Filtering does not 
mean simply removing functional elements from patent drawings with a 
black marker as if such elements did not exist. Instead, filtering requires 
the court to instruct the jury about which elements are functional. While it 
should consider the design as a whole, neither should it give too much (or 
any) weight to similarities in functional elements. It is no wonder that 
courts do not want to instruct juries on filtering, but making the attempt is 
better than the alternative. Indeed, this test has been applied quite usefully 
in the copyright context while comparing the overall works (rather than 
element by element). So-called “thinly” copyrighted works require a 
higher level of similarity to find infringement.129 
Without filtering, patentees can seek ever widening infringement 
claims based on reuse of the ideas and functions in the patent, rather than 
reuse of the actual design. The great irony of Egyptian Goddess is that it 
disapproves of written claim constructions layered on the drawings 
themselves; the court makes clear that the drawings should speak for 
themselves if they can.130 Relying on the drawings without filtering leads 
to the very thing Egyptian Goddess disapproves: infringement rulings 
based not on the drawings but based on the ideas and functions in the 
drawings. 
Thus, courts should compare patented design claims against accused 
infringers as a whole, but while ensuring that infringement should not be 
based on similarities due to prior art or functionality. Some district courts 
have adopted this framework with the Federal Circuit’s approval, and the 
remaining courts should be instructed to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The kinship between copyright infringement analysis and patentable 
subject matter is a secret, misunderstood one, the beleaguered stepchild 
cleaning floors in the attic. This essay has sought to bring the relationship 
into the light and create a Cinderella. Though abstraction, filtration, and 
comparison is not accepted in every circuit, the idea of excluding 
 
infringement. Worse, appellate courts cannot guess; they must assume that filtering took place 
and assume that the jury properly compared only the ornamental features, even if the jury did 
not do so. 
129 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rather, 
considering the license and the limited number of ways that the basic ideas of the Apple GUI 
can be expressed differently, we conclude that only ‘thin’ protection, against virtually identical 
copying, is appropriate. Apple’s appeal, which depends on comparing its interface as a whole 
for substantial similarity, must therefore fail.”). 
130 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F. 3d at 679. 
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unprotected subject matter is common, and should be used in both 
copyright and patent analysis. 
With patent law, the fit is easier with design patents than with utility 
patents. With design patents, unpatentable subject matter — functionality 
— may be excluded from the infringement comparison. But the tables are 
turned with patentable subject matter: unpatentable elements are 
considered only at the protection stage, and the unpatentable is filtered out 
to see if anything patentable remains. 
A key question, then, is why a similar approach shouldn’t work with 
design patents, which are still patents, after all. The answer lies in the lack 
of claiming, which would identify the elements necessary for 
infringement. This problem has vexed courts in novelty, obviousness, and 
claim construction for years, and this essay will not seek to solve it. But 
so long as design patent claims are a series of drawings, then any 
patentable subject matter inquiry must take place at the infringement stage, 
just as it does with copyright. In both cases, virtually everything (except 
pure function or pure fact, respectively) is protected, and the only way to 
police subject matter is to abstract, filter, and compare when determining 
the scope of the right.  
Because utility patent claims are based on particular elemental claims, 
then either all of a claim is protected, or none of it is. It does raise the 
question for another day: could utility patent subject matter be handled at 
the infringement stage? If abstract ideas and natural phenomena were 
filtered out prior to comparing claim elements, perhaps all three systems 
could coexist under the same infringement framework. 
